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I. INTRODUCTION

On Wednesday, April 29, 2009, a Mexican child, being treated at a
hospital in Texas, became the first casualty of the swine flu in the
United States.1 By that time, hundreds of cases had already been
reported worldwide. 2 Healthcare officials have been worried about and
planning for an influenza pandemic since the first bird flu scare in the
early 2000s. 3 Now those plans are being put to the test. Countries as
far away as China have put people under quarantine in an effort to stop
the spread of the HiNi influenza strain. 4 In the United States, some
5
schools have even cancelled their graduation ceremonies.
Virginia has been taking its own precautions. On April 27, 2009, Dr.
Karen Remley, Virginia's Health Commissioner, declared the
Commonwealth to be in a state of public-health emergency. 6 Virginia
Governor Timothy Kaine also requested an extra 280,000 courses of
antiviral medications to add to Virginia's stockpile, bringing the state's
total

1. Toddler Dies as Swine Flu Cases Mount, CNN.COM, Apr. 30, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/
HEALTH/04/29/swine.flu.cases/index.htnl?iref=newssearch (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
2. Id.
3. Ctr. for Disease Control, Past Avian Influenza Outbreaks,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/outbreaks/past.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
4. Farmer May Have Given Swine Flu to Pigs, Canada Says, CNN.COM, May 2, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/05/02/swine.flu/index.htnil (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
5. Mallory Simon, Students Can't Be Part of Main Graduation Because of Mexico Trip, CNN.COM,
May 2, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/05/01/swine.flu.schools/index.html (last visited Mar.
15, 2010).
6. Tammie Smith & Jim Nolan, State Preparesfor Flu Outbreak, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 28,
2009, at Al, available at http://www.timesdispatch.com/rtd/news/local/article/VFLU28_20090427222106/264318/.
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stockpile to over one million. 7 While the state's efforts show that it is
being vigilant in preparing for a mass outbreak, there is only so much
that can be done before the virus hits on a widespread scale.
Though it is too early to tell if this HiNi strain will become a
pandemic, it will at least serve to keep decision-makers alert and
thinking about how to improve plans for pandemic response. One often
forgotten aspect of planning is the consideration of legal issues, which
permeate every aspect of a pandemic-from the planning to the cleanup stages. A public health emergency, especially one for a contagious
disease like influenza, is quite different than a natural or manmade
disaster, like a hurricane or a terrorist attack. There is no ground zero.
Because the virus is spread through human contact, it will spread to
every corner of the globe. A pandemic has the potential to affect every
sector of the nation, from schools to banking, from food distribution to,
most obviously, the healthcare system. The question is not whether
hospitals will be overwhelmed; it is whether hospitals will be open since
healthcare workers are just as susceptible to the virus as anyone.
So how can Virginia officials make sure that the Commonwealth is
legally prepared for a pandemic? One overarching problem of pandemic
planning throughout the country is that there has not been enough
communication between the legal community and the health
community. 8 Healthcare workers have a set of norms they use every
day, and they can instinctively react to emergencies. In a pandemic, all
of those norms get thrown out the window, and what they instinctively
want to do may not be legal. 9 The first step to preparing for a pandemic
must be to bring both sides of the problem together. Another difficulty
has been that even when the legal and healthcare communities come
together, they look at a few issues, independent from each other. 10 For
example, they will decide what they can do about social distancing,
distributing antivirals, and dealing with the surge in hospitals, but they
might forget to ask who has the authority and when they have that
authority to make these decisions. And what if their plans rely on a
neighboring state's aid, but that state cannot afford to provide any
additional resources? We cannot look at the legal issues of pandemic
influenza in a vacuum. This paper attempts to identify the legal issues
at stake during a pandemic and how those issues need to be discussed as a
7. Id.
8. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, http://www.hhs.gov/
pandemicflu/plan/sup8.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
9. See id.
10. See id.

20101

PANDMIC INFLUENZA

whole when preparing for a pandemic. Part II of this paper will give a
brief description of pandemic influenza and look at the Spanish Flu
pandemic of 1918.11 Part III will examine the origins of legal authority
during a pandemic at the federal, state, and local levels of government.
Part IV will look at some of the specific legal issues that may arise
during a pandemic and discuss what decision-makers need to be thinking
about in order to plan comprehensively.
Part V will conclude by
determining whether or not Virginia is legally prepared for pandemic
influenza.
II. HISTORY OF PANDEMIC INFLUENZA

A. What is Pandemic Influenza?
The problem with pandemic influenza is the unknown. Pandemic
influenza ("pan flu") is different from the seasonal flu we experience on
an annual basis.1 2 "Pandemic influenza is a global outbreak of disease
that occurs when a new influenza A virus appears in humans, causes
serious illness and then spreads easily from person to person
worldwide. 1 3 Because it is so rare and because it is a mutated form of
the seasonal virus, humans normally have not built up immunities to it,
making its effects more severe, even for healthy adults.1 4 Normally,
when a person in their twenties gets the flu, he might take two or three
days off of work (or not, if he is a law student) and feel better by the end
of the week, especially if he received a flu shot at the beginning of the
season. This is not the case for pandemic influenza. There is no flu
shot for pandemic influenza, at least in its beginning stages, because labs
15
can only make vaccines for a known virus.
The high level of contagiousness and severe symptoms of pan flu can
potentially lead to a catastrophic situation affecting every part of our

11. There were also pandemics in 1957 and 1968, but it is outside the scope of this paper to discuss
each outbreak in the United States. Ctr. for Disease Control, Influenza Pandemics of the 20th Century,
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/voll2noOl/05-1254.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). Instead, I will
discuss the 1918 pandemic because it was the most severe in the country's history and note its
implications for legally preparedness now.
12. Va. Dep't of Health, Pandemic Influenza, http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/PandemicFlu/ (last visited
Mar. 15, 2010) [hereinafter VDH Pandemic Influenza].
13. Id.
14. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., How Does Seasonal Flu Differ from Pandemic Flu,
http://pandemicflu.gov/season orpandemic.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
15. Va. Dep't of Health, Pandemic Influenza: Vaccines and Antivirals, http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/
PandemicFlu/Vaccines Antivirals.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
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daily lives. No country will be safe, and every age group will be
vulnerable. In a time when global travel is the norm, the virus will
spread faster than ever across the world. 16 A pandemic could affect
global markets and create an economic crisis. 17 Access to utilities like
power and water could be disturbed if enough people become sick.1 8 If
our military is exposed, which it no doubt would be in a widespread
pandemic, our war-fighting effort could be hampered.1 9 While there is a
possibility that it could be mild, effecting thousands instead of millions,
there is also the possibility that the death toll could be astronomical, like
it was in 1918.20

B. The Spanish Flu of 1918
Perhaps one of the reasons the United States is so fearful of an
influenza pandemic is the history of the disease. In 1918, it is estimated
that an influenza pandemic (the "Spanish Flu") killed 675,000
Americans in a period of only ten months. 21 As World War I ended,
thousands of soldiers came home from Europe, bringing the virus with
them. 22 This strain of the virus brought 105 degree temperatures, severe
body and joint aches, and sometimes led to pneumonia. 23 The Spanish
Flu also demonstrated a common characteristic of pan flu-it occurred
in waves. 24 The Spanish Flu occurred in three different waves, one
beginning in the Spring of 1918, the second in the Fall of 1918, and the

16. World Health Org., Pandemic Preparedness, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/pandemic/
en (last visited Mar. 15, 2010) [hereinafter WHO Pandemic Preparedness].
17. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND

RECOVERY
20-25 (Sept.
19,
2006)
available
cikrpandemicinfluenzaguide.pdf.
18. See VDH Pandemic Influenza, supranote 12.
19. See WHO Pandemic Preparedness, supranote 16.
20. See VDH Pandemic Influenza, supranote 12.

at

http://www.flu.gov/professional/pdf/

21. ALFRED W. CROSBY, AMERICA'S FORGOTTEN PANDEMIC: THE INFLUENZA OF 1918, at 206

(Cambridge University Press 2003) (1976). While we cannot be sure how many died worldwide due
to inaccurate reporting, experts estimate that the Spanish flu killed an estimated twenty million people
throughout the world. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., The Great Pandemic: Influenza Strikes,
http://1918.pandemicflu.gov/thepandemic/01.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2010) [hereinafter Influenza
Strikes]. In Virginia alone, over 15,500 people died. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., The
Great Pandemic: Virginia, http://1918.pandemicflu.gov/your state/virginia.htm (last visited Mar. 15,
2010).
22. Influenza Strikes, supranote 21.
23. Id.
24. THE THREAT OF PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 8 (Stacey L. Knobler et al. eds., 2005).
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third in the Spring of 1919.25
The second wave was actually the
26
deadliest, claiming ninety percent of the total casualties.
There are numerous lessons to learn from the Spanish Flu. In 2006,
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services hosted a workshop to discuss
lessons learned from the 1918 pandemic. 27 The panel identified the
necessity of truthful communication between public officials and private
citizens as an important issue. 28 During the Spanish Flu, because of the
political climate created by World War I, public officials, in an attempt
to subdue the fears of the public, routinely lied about the seriousness of
the virus. 29 There was great disconnect in the information the public
was getting from their elected officials and public health officials.30 This
led to an atmosphere of distrust, and it is this distrust that decisionmakers need to be aware of when planning, because, as one panelist said,
"It is when people feel totally alienated and isolated that society breaks
down. '31 When people feel helpless, there is more potential for rioting
or other outbreaks, requiring the use of law enforcement during public
health emergencies. Truthful communication about the disease to the
public may be the first step in legal preparedness, because it has the
ability to repress social unrest. While this atmosphere of distrust can
stem from poor communication, it can also result from ill
preparedness-what is the point of communicating with the public if the
government has no plans to ensure its safety? For this reason, fully
planning for pandemic response is vital to making sure that the
government does not have to respond to social unrest on top of a public
health emergency. This planning must incorporate legally preparing for
issues that will arise during a pandemic.

25. Influenza Strikes, supranote 21.
26. GlobalSecurity.org,
Homeland
Security: Flu Pandemic
Timeline/Event Dynamics,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/hsc-scen-3_flu-pandemic-timeline.htm (last visited Mar. 15,
2010).
27. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION & U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA, PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE: COMMUNICATING TODAY BASED ON THE LESSONS

FROM THE 1918-1919 INFLUENZA PANDEMIC (Oct. 17, 2006), available at http://www.pandemicflu.

gov/general/workshop.pdf.
28. Id. at 8.
29. See id. at 7 ("There was a lot of cognitive dissonance. People heard from authorities and
newspapers that everything was fine, but at the same time, bodies were piling up.").
30. See id. at 10 ("In Baltimore, there were fights between elected officials and public health officials
....
In Pittsburg, the Mayor actually told the public to ignore public health officials.").
31. Id.
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III. LEGAL AUTHORITY
An essential aspect of legal preparedness is a firm understanding by all
those involved in pandemic response of who has what power and when
they have that power. Many times, the answers will be different
depending on the state, and even the locality.
A. Federal Powers
Federal authority for regulating matters that affect public health
initially comes from the Commerce Clause and Congress's "power of the
purse. '32 These Constitutional authorities, read broadly, have become
the foundation for numerous laws enacted by Congress to regulate public
health emergencies. The majority of federal powers to act during a
public health emergency are created in three laws: the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act ("Stafford Act"), the
Public Health Services Act, and the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act ("PAHPA"). 33 Under the Stafford Act, the President
may declare a state of emergency at the request of a Governor when
there is a disaster "of such severity and magnitude that effective
response is beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local
governments and that Federal assistance is necessary. '34 Once the
President has declared a state of emergency, federal resources, including
"personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities, and managerial, technical and
advisory services" can be deployed to the state in support of state and
local recovery efforts. 35
Governors and their senior emergency
management staff need to be cognizant when asking the President to
declare a state of emergency that these federal resources will likely be
coordinated by federal authorities. 36 This may come as a surprise to
some state officials and could present command and control problems in
the response and recovery of a pandemic. For example, if federal
resources in the form of antivirals are being distributed by federal
employees, those employees may not be aware of (or not be required to
abide by) a state plan for distribution. This could cause public confusion
about who will get the antivirals and where they are supposed to go.

32. Brian Kamoie et. al., Assessing Laws and Legal Authoritiesfor Public Health Emergency Legal
Preparedness,36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 23, 24 (2008) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
33. James G. Hodge, Jr. & Evan D. Anderson, Principlesand Practice of Legal Triage DuringPublic
Health Emergencies, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 249, 257 (2008).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2006).
35. Id. § 5170a(1).
36. Id. § 5170a(2).
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Part of the legal preparation for a possible declaration of a state of
emergency must be a plan for the integration of federal resources into
the state's preexisting response plans.
Under the Public Health Services Act, the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services may determine that there is
a public health emergency, allowing him to "take such action as may be
appropriate to respond to the public health emergency, including making
grants, providing awards for expenses, and entering into contracts and
conducting and supporting investigations into the cause, treatment, or
prevention of [the] disease. '37 This declaration will last ninety days or
upon termination by the Secretary, whichever is sooner, but it may be
renewed if needed.38 Specifically, this Act allows the Secretary to track
and distribute federally purchased vaccines during a pandemic. 39 Finally,
the Act has an incentive built into it, allowing the Secretary to make
awards to states that have completed and implemented, among other
things, a pandemic influenza plan as part of their All-Hazards Public
40
Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan.
In 2006, Congress enacted the PAHPA when the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina revealed the confusion caused by multi-layers of
declarations, each carrying its own authorizations for federal
assistance. 41 PAHPA answers the "who" question by identifying the
Secretary of Health and Human Services as the leader of "all Federal
public health and medical response to public health emergencies and
incidents. '42 While centralizing federal power in one official should ease
communication issues between states and the federal government,
decision-makers need to be aware of this power to account for it in
pandemic planning.

37. Id. § 247d(a).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 247d-l(a), (b).
40. Id. § 247d-3a(b)(2)(A). This is an example of how the federal government uses its purse to
influence state governments. Though it is not able to mandate that states adopt certain plans, it is able
to provide incentives for them to do so. See Ernest B. Abbott, Law, Federalism, the Constitution,and
Control of Pandemic Flu, 9 ASiAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 185, 192-93 (2008). See also Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) ("Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal
regulatory program .... The Federal government may neither issue directives requiring the States to
address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivision, to
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.").
41. See Hodge & Anderson, supranote 33, at 261-62.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 300hh(a) (2006).
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B. State Powers
The Governor of Virginia is the Director of Emergency Management
and has power to declare a state of emergency whenever "the safety and
welfare of the people of the Commonwealth require the exercise of
emergency measures due to a threatened or actual disaster. '43 He also
has the power to request that the President declare a disaster so the
44
Commonwealth may be able to obtain federal assistance.
The position
of State Health Commissioner of Virginia
("Commissioner") is established in the Code of Virginia at section 32.117.45
The State Health Commission is the head of the Virginia
Department of Health ("VDH") 46 and is responsible for coordinating
VDH's response to public health emergencies. 47 Virginia also has the
Virginia Board of Health, 48 which has the responsibility to "promulgate
regulations and orders to meet any emergency or to prevent a potential
'49
emergency caused by a disease dangerous to public health.
A declaration of a state of emergency in Virginia triggers special
powers for the Commissioner.
For example, during a state of
emergency, the Commissioner may authorize certain persons to dispense
drugs when they would not normally be authorized to do so.50 The
Commissioner may also make use of any private or public building to
enforce an order of quarantine or isolation.51 Even when a state of
emergency has not been declared, the Commissioner may "require
quarantine, isolation, immunization, decontamination, or treatment of
any individual or group of individuals when he determines any such
measure to be necessary to control the spread of any disease of public
health importance. '52
This power is important, especially at the
beginning of a pandemic when only a few localities are affected and the
Governor has not yet declared a state of emergency. The Commissioner

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.17(7) (2009).

Id. § 44-146.17(8).
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-17 (2009).
Id. § 32.1-16.
Id. § 32.1-19(D).
Id. § 32.1-5.
Id. § 32.1-42.
Id. § 32.1-42.1.
Id. § 32.1-48.017.
Id. § 32.1-43.
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may also require citizens to be immunized during a pandemic if a vaccine
exists.5 3
C. Local Powers
In Virginia, each locality (both cities and counties) must have its own
local health department.5 4 Typically pan flu spreads so quickly that the
Governor would react immediately and the state response system would
go into effect. However, before that happens, local health departments
may promulgate and follow their own rules and regulations, as long as
they are not "less stringent in the protection of public health than any
55
applicable state law or applicable regulations of the Board [of Health].,
Localities will want to have plans in place for dealing with a sudden
outbreak in a hospital. In addition, the state needs to make sure that
when writing its pan flu plan, it accounts for the differences in localities,
especially in Virginia, where Fairfax County will have much more robust
healthcare facilities than Washington County.
D. First Responders
In addition to knowing who is in charge, it is important to understand
who will respond to a pandemic and how they fit into the command
structure of that response. The magnitude of a pan flu response will
require the assistance of numerous agencies, organizations, and
individuals. While very few of these individuals are actually "in charge,"
many times they are operating within a complex and confusing response
network. One of the first steps to legal preparedness must be to help
every responder understand his role in the system and how to get what
he needs to adequately fulfill this role. As the Principal of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency Law Associates noted, "[g]iven the
number and the diversity of organizations that respond to a disaster and
the lack of a single 'commander' of those resources, it is critical that
' 56
these institutions 'speak the same language.'
The federal government and many states, including Virginia, have
enacted laws and procedures to ensure that everyone "speaks the same
language" during an emergency response. After 9/11, President Bush
issued Homeland Security Directives 5 and 8, requiring the Department

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. § 32.1-48(A).
Id. § 32.1-30.
Id. § 32.1-34.
Abbott, supranote 40, at 193.
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of Homeland Security to create a National Incident Management System
("NIMS") to ensure that responses are quick and seamless between
agencies.5 7 NIMS was approved on March 1, 2004 and "establishe[ed]
standard incident management processes, protocols and procedures so
that all local, state, federal and private-sector emergency responders can
coordinate their responses, share a common focus and place full
emphasis on resolving the event. 58 Because NIMS provides a template
for managing emergencies, each locality and state should have the same
information during a large scale disaster.5 9 During a pandemic, if all
localities and states are NIMS compliant, volunteers will be able to travel

from one locality to another without having to learn a new system for
providing help and requesting resources. This coordination will be vital
to a successful response, especially in the chaotic atmosphere of a
pandemic. 60
The federal government once again uses funding to
incentivize the states to adopt NIMS-compliance is required by both
local governments and state agencies to receive federal preparedness
61
assistance.

IV. LEGAL ISSUES

On top of these complex systems of authority numerous legal issues
for pandemic response arise. This section will identify a number of
these issues and also show why it is important that decision-makers not
look at them independently, but comprehensively and within the
existing law for public health emergencies.
A. Social Distancing
Though many automatically think of quarantine as the first response

57. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 (Feb.
28, 2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.htnil; Press Release, Office of the
Press Sec'y, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8 (Dec. 17, 2003), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc 1215444247124.shtm. Part of these directives codified NIMS in
the Homeland Security Act. See 6 U.S.C. §§ 319, 320 (2002 & Supp. 2009). Note how this was a legal
response to an operating issue. See also Abbott, supra note 40, at 194.
58. Va. Dep't of Emergency Mgmt., Programs & Services: NIMS,
http://www.vaemergency.com/programs/nims/index.cfn (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
59. See generally Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, About the National Incident Management System
(NIMS), http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/AboutNIMS.shtm (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
60. See Demetrios L. Kouzoukas, Public Health Emergency Legal Preparedness:Legal Practitioner
Perspectives,36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 18, 20-21 (2008).
61. See Va. Dep't of Emergency Mgmt., Programs & Services: NIMS, http://www.vaemergency.
com/programs/nims/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
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to a widespread public health emergency involving a contagious disease,
there are other less drastic steps that can be taken first. There are
several ways to create social distance between populations to try to stop
the spread of pan flu, including closing schools or offices, isolating
infected individuals, and quarantining others.
1. Closing Schools and Offices
The first step in social distancing is voluntary. Parents can choose to
keep a sick child home from school and take time off work during the
62
incubation period, which is five days after the onset of symptoms.
After that, communities need to consider closing schools for a period of
63
time in order to reduce the level of exposure to the larger community.
As one report noted, "modeling and analyses suggest that widespread
school closures may reduce the incidence of infection (i.e. the attack
rate) in a community over a period of time. '64 The same would be true
of closing offices or allowing people to work from home.
While closing schools may help to mitigate the spread of pan flu,
depending on the length of the closure, it could also have an adverse
effect on families and communities. Besides children missing school,
potentially for months, parents will also have to make plans to care for
them. 65 If parents have to leave their jobs to stay home with their
66
children, the economic stability of the community could be at risk.
For this reason, states should work with the private sector to establish
guidelines for alternative work schedules during a pandemic, such as
telecommuting. Fortunately, because of advances in technology, this
will be much more feasible than during past pandemics.
Virginia has identified school closures as an option for controlling the
spread of pan flu in its Pandemic Influenza Plan. 67 This plan identifies
who has the authority to close schools: (1) "the ability of local school
boards and superintendents to close school is inherent in the power given

62. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN: SUPPLEMENT 4,
INFECTION CONTROL, at S4-17 (Nov. 2005), available at http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/
pdf/S04.pdf.
63. CTR. FOR LAW & THE PUB. HEALTH, LEGAL PREPAREDNESS FOR SCHOOL CLOSURES IN RESPONSE
TO PANDEMIC INFLUENZA AND OTHER EMERGENCIES 8 (Apr. 2008), available at http://www.
pandemicflu.gov/professional/school/schoolclosures.pdf

64. Id. at 10.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See VA. DEP'T OF EDUC., PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN: GUIDELINES FOR VIRGINIA PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 5 (May 2008), available at http://www.doe.virginia.gov/VDOE/studentsrvcs/panflu.pdf.
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to them in Article VIII, Section 7 of the Constitution of Virginia," and
(2) "the Board of Health has the authority to close schools in order to
prevent a potential emergency caused by a disease dangerous to public
health (Code of Virginia at § 32.1-42)."68 The problem with these
authorizations is that they are not clear as to when and who may close a
school. According to this plan, section 32.1-42 of the Code of Virginia
authorizes the Board of Health to close schools. This section reads:
The Board of Health may promulgate regulations and
orders to meet any emergency or to prevent a potential
emergency caused by a disease dangerous to public health,
including, but not limited to, procedures specifically
responding to any disease listed pursuant to § 32.1-35
that is determined to be caused by an agent or substance
used as a weapon or any communicable disease of public
health threat that is involved in an order of quarantine
or an order of isolation pursuant to Article 3.02 (§ 32.169
48.05 et seq.) of this chapter.
This section never clearly states that the Board of Health may close
schools and does not say whether or not there must be a declaration of a
state of emergency by the Governor beforehand. Similarly vague, article
VIII, section 7 of the Virginia Constitution, which the plan claims gives
authority to local school board to close schools states, "[t]he
supervision of schools in each school division shall be vested in a school
board, to be composed of members selected in the manner, for the term,
7
possessing the qualifications, and to the number provided by law.'
Neither of these sources expressly gives authority to either entity to
close schools. While that authority would probably be deemed by a court
to be inherent, it leaves the officials confused as to when they can close
a school. This confusion could lead to slow reactions, whereas, if the law
expressly created the authority, response would be faster and more
effective.
2. Isolation and Quarantine
Isolation and quarantine are more drastic steps aimed at restricting
people's movements to limit the spread of pan flu by creating a "social
distance" between the exposed and the general population. Isolation

68. Id.
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-42 (2009).
70. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 7.
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occurs when a patient who has been diagnosed with a communicable
disease is removed from the public. 71 A quarantine occurs when people
who have not been diagnosed with a communicable disease, but have
72
been or may have been exposed to one, are isolated from the public.
This difference is important because where people who have been
diagnosed will probably be willing to be isolated because they know they
pose a health risk to the public, people who have not been diagnosed
may see no reason for their quarantine and so may challenge it on
constitutional due process grounds. 73 For this reason, it is vital that
lawmakers carefully and clearly lay out the circumstances in which
people can be mandatorily isolated or quarantined.
It is equally
important that these steps are followed during a public health
emergency.
For example, in Best v. St. Vincents Hospital, Best was diagnosed with
tuberculosis and detained by the hospital as a health risk to the
community because he was contagious and refused to complete his
treatment. 74 He sued the hospital and the State, claiming that his Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights had been violated. 75 Best
first argued that his substantive due process rights had been violated
because New York's tuberculosis control statutes violated his
fundamental right to liberty. 76 The court noted that "substantive due

71. See Abbott, supra note 40, at 195. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-48.06 (2009) ("'Isolation'
means the physical separation, including confinement or restriction of movement, of an individual or
individuals who are infected with or are reasonably suspected to be infected with a communicable
disease of public health threat in order to prevent or limit the transmission of the communicable
disease of public health threat to other uninfected and unexposed individuals.").
72. See Abbott, supra note 40 at 196. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-48.06 (2009) ("'Quarantine'
means the physical separation, including confinement or restriction of movement, of an individual or
individuals who are present within an affected area, as defined herein, or who are known to have
been exposed or may reasonably be suspected to have been exposed to a communicable disease of
public health threat and who do not yet show signs or symptoms of infection with the communicable
disease of public health threat in order to prevent or limit the transmission of the communicable
disease of public health threat to other unexposed and uninfected individuals.").
73. See Abbott, supranote 40, at 196-99.
74. Best v. St. Vincents Hosp., No. 03CV.0365, 2003 WL 21518829, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The
statute that authorized Best's detention allowed quarantine for a person with tuberculosis when:
there is a substantial likelihood, based on the person's past or present behavior,
that the individual cannot be relied upon to participate in or complete an
appropriate prescribed course of medication or, if necessary, follow required
contagion precautions for tuberculosis. Such behavior may include the refusal or
failure to take medication or to complete treatment for tuberculosis, to keep
appointments for the treatment of tuberculosis, or a disregard for contagion
precautions.
Id. at *9.
75. Id. at *1.
76. Id. at *5-6.
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process comes into play where, regardless of the procedures followed, a
governmental decision or action is so contrary to a fundamental right
that it cannot be countenanced. '77 Here, the court found that Best's
liberty was a fundamental right, which had been substantially infringed
when he was held in the hospital against his will. 78 The only way the
hospital could overcome violating Best's due process rights would be to
show that the State had a "substantial governmental interest" in
detaining him against his will. 79 The court noted that previously the
Supreme Court of the United States had upheld the constitutionality of
quarantine laws as public health measures.80 Finally, it found that there
must be an assessment of each individual to determine whether he would
comply with the hospital's recommendations for social isolation during
the contagious period of tuberculosis and that according to Best's past
behavior, like refusing to continue his treatment, he would not be willing
to comply with the hospital's recommendations.8 1 Therefore, while
Best's substantive due process rights were violated, the hospital had a
substantial governmental interest in continuing his detention to protect
82
the community.
Best also claimed that his procedural due process rights were
violated.8 3 The statute allowing Best's quarantine set out specific
procedural guidelines to be followed, such as obtaining a court order for
the detention after a certain number of days, and the court found that
the hospital followed them when detaining Best. 84 Additionally, the
court found that the processes laid out in the statute were sufficient to
protect his procedural due process under the Constitution.85
Best highlights potential legal issues with quarantine laws for pan flu and
conveys the message that to confront constitutional challenges, states must
be legally prepared to handle possible quarantine. If a state is not legally
prepared for a quarantine, then, in the midst of an influenza pandemic, the

77. Id. at *6.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) ("Although this court has refrained
from any attempt to define the limits of [the state's police] power,.... it has distinctly recognized the
authority of a State to enact quarantine laws and health laws of every description.") (internal
quotations omitted).
81. Best, 2003 WL 21518829 at *7.
82. Id.
83. Id. at *9.
84. Id. at *10.
85. Id. at *13.
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courts could become backlogged with complaints and sick people could be
allowed back into the community on a legal technicality.
Fortunately in Virginia, the Attorney General's Office and VDH have
worked hard to ensure that the Commonwealth is legally prepared for
quarantine during pan flu.8 6

Under section 32.1-43 of the Code of

Virginia, the Commissioner has the authority to require quarantine or
isolation of an individual or group when he determines that it is
"necessary to control the spread of any disease of public health
importance. '87 Under normal circumstances, before a person can be
isolated or quarantined, there are detailed procedures that must be
followed. 88 During a pandemic, these procedures, which include an
investigation to find that the individual has a communicable disease and
is engaging in "at-risk" behavior, will likely be too cumbersome and
lengthy to make the isolation or quarantine effective. 89 In this
situation, the Commissioner may find that there are "exceptional
circumstances" 90 and,
initiate a more rapid response by: issuing orders to
immediately isolate an infected or potentially infected
person; issuing orders to immediately quarantine exposed
or potentially exposed persons; [or] issuing orders to
isolate and/or quarantine individuals as a group through
defining an "affected area" (when a state of emergency
has been declared by the Governor for the affected
area). 91
Even during exceptional circumstance, there are specific procedures that
must be followed to insure that an individual's due process is not
92
violated.
Virginia's legal and health communities have created a comprehensive
legal scheme for isolation and quarantine. This preparation will enable
health care officials (as long as they abide by the procedures set forth in
the Code of Virginia) to efficiently and effectively distance exposed and
infected individuals from the general population without major legal
86. See VA. DEP'T OF HEALTH & VA. ATTORNEY GENS. OFFICE, AN OVERVIEW OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA'S STATUTORY AUTHORITIES RELEVANT TO SOCIAL DISTANCING (July

31, 2007), available at http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/EPR/pdf/Social%/o2ODistancing%/o2OLaw%/o2OProject
%20Phaseo201o207 31 07.pdf [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF VIRGINIA SOCIAL DISTANCING].
87. VA. CODE ANN. §32.1-43 (2009).
88. See id. §§ 32.1-48.02, 32.1-48.03, 32.1-48.04.
89. Id. §32.1-48.02.
90. VA. CODE ANN. §32.1-48.05 (2009).
91. OVERVIEW OF VIRGINIA SOCIAL DISTANCING, supra note 86, at 14.
92. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-48.05, 32.1-48.07 (2009).
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problems encumbering the process. This fast response is key to ensuring
the spread of pan flu is curtailed as quickly as possible.
B. Mutual Aid and Liability Concerns
During any public health emergency, a community's resources can be
quickly overwhelmed, making it necessary to rely on outside assistance.
This assistance can come from other states, volunteer organizations, or
the private sector. However, the additional assistance comes with
liability concerns. According to one study,
Almost sixty percent of clinicians indicated that having
medical malpractice insurance coverage would be
important (24.3%) or essential (35.4%) to their decision
to travel out of state to provide assistance during an
emergency.
Almost seventy percent of respondents
answered that immunity from civil lawsuits would be an
important (35.6%) or essential (33.8%) factor when
considering whether to volunteer in an emergency. 93
Especially amidst the chaos of a pan flu epidemic, health care
professionals and volunteers will have to work quickly and perhaps at a
lower standard of care than what they would normally provide. This
opens the door to negligence suits, from which they will want immunity
if they are going to provide assistance.
1. Emergency Management Assistance Compact ("EMAC")
Developed as a mutual aid agreement among the states, EMPAC
addresses issues of liability and resource sharing so a state does not have
to be concerned with these issues during an emergency. 94 Virginia
codified EMAC in 1995. 95 One of the main purposes of EMAC is to
promote "[t]he prompt, full, and effective utilization of resources of the
participating states, including any resources on hand or available from
the federal government or any other source, that are essential to the
safety, care, and welfare of the people in the event of any

93. Sharona Hoffman, Responders' Responsibility: Liability and Immunity in Public Health
Emergencies, 96 GEO. L.J.1913, 1917 (2008).
94. See generally Nat'l Emergency Mgmt. Ass'n, Emergency Management Assistance Compact,
http://www.emacweb.org/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2010) (explaining that EMAC is an organization that
provides "form and structure to interstate mutual aid" and allows impacted states to request and
receive assistance quickly and efficiently).
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.28:1 (2009).
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emergency. '96 As long as the assisting state does not need the resources
for its own emergency, it must provide assistance (including use of
National Guard Forces) to the requesting state. 97
Two important provisions of EMAC discuss licensing and liability.
Under Article V, a person who is licensed in one state to provide services
will be deemed to be licensed in the requesting state to provide those
same services during a declared emergency. 98 This is important because
normally a nurse, for example, would only be able to practice in the
state in which she is licensed. 99 EMAC recognizes that during a
pandemic, nurses do not have time to register in another state and
carves out an exception from the existing law for assistance during
declarations of emergencies.
Under Article VI, EMAC limits liability for officers or employees of
the assisting state. 100 It provides:
No party state or its officers or employees rendering aid
in another state pursuant to this compact shall be liable
on account of any act or omission in good faith on the
part of such forces while so engaged or on account of the
maintenance or use of any equipment or supplies in
connection therewith. 10 1
While EMAC limits liability for acts or omissions "in good faith," it
does not limit liability for willful misconduct, gross negligence, or
recklessness.10 2 This is an important distinction, because resources will
be coming in from many different places-individuals must have a legal
recourse for injuries they sustain due to a complete lack of care by
officials or employees of the assisting state. Some experts have noted
that legal gaps remain in this section of EMAC. The limited liability
protection only applies to officers and employees of the assisting state,
but not to other individuals, and it does not apply before the governor of
the requesting state has declared a state of emergency.10 3
These
important issues will have to be addressed in other sections of the law.

96. Id. §44-146.28:1, art. II.
97. See id. §44-146.28:1, art. IV.
98. See id. §44-146.28:1, art. V.
99. See id. §§ 54.1-3005, 54.1-3008.
100. See id. §44-146.28:1, art. VI.
101. Id.
102. Id.

103. Rick Hogan et al., Assessing Cross-Sectoral and Cross-JurisdictionalCoordinationfor Public
Health Emergency Legal Preparedness,36 J.L. MED. & ETmICS 36, 39(2008).
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2. Volunteers and the Private Sector
During a pandemic, Virginia's state and local resources will quickly be
exhausted. Federal aid may or may not be available, depending on the
severity and spread of the virus. Volunteers, both individuals and
organizations, will be critical to Virginia's response. As was previously
noted, volunteers may be hesitant to come forward if there are no
limitation of liability laws to protect them. Virginia has recently
expanded immunity statutes, which traditionally only protected
government employees, to cover volunteers during emergencies.
Like many states, Virginia also has a Good Samaritan statute that
limits liability for individuals who render aid at the scene of an
accident. 10 4 The Code of Virginia protects individuals and doctors who
render aid without receiving compensation during an emergency.105 This
statute, however, leaves a gap for pan flu, which is an ongoing condition
and not an "emergency" as we would generally think of the word. There
is another statute specifically granting immunity to healthcare providers
who provide aid during disasters or emergencies, and an emergency in
this statute will include pan flu. 10 6 This statute may assist healthcare
providers who will be the primary responders during pan flu, but they will
still need the assistance of other groups to provide additional aid and
resources.
In 2004, Virginia codified immunity for two volunteer groups: the
Virginia Medical Reserve Corps and Community Emergency Response
Teams.107 The Virginia Medical Reserve Corps are "teams of local
volunteer medical, public health professionals, and community members
who volunteer to contribute their skills, expertise, and time to support
ongoing public health initiatives and public health emergencies in
localities across Virginia."10 8 Community Emergency Response Teams
("CERTs") are locally based groups of volunteers (training is open to
any citizen) that come in during a disaster to provide assistance to first
responders.10 9 Virginia provides these groups civil immunity as long as

104. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225(A)(1) (2009).
105. Id. § 8.01-225(B).
106. Id. §§ 8.01-225.01, 8.01-225.02.
107. Id. § 31.2-48.016.
108. Va. Dep't of Health, Virginia Medical Reserve Corps, http://www.vdh.state.va.us/mrc/ (last
visited Mar. 15, 2010).
109. See, e.g,. Charlottesville-UVA Albemarle County CERT, What is CERT?, http://www.
charlottesvillecert.org/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
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they perform their duties in good faith and in accordance with Virginia
law and regulations. 110
But what about the volunteers who are not part of these groups (like
church groups or Red Cross volunteers)? In 2009, the Virginia General
Assembly passed limited liability legislation for individuals and groups
who volunteer:
1) pursuant to a Governor-declared emergency or during
a formal exercise or training of the State Department of
Emergency Management or a responsible county or city
emergency management entity; and 2) at the request and
direction of the State Department of Emergency
Management or a county or city employee whose
responsibilities include emergency management. 1

Though there is no case law to test this new statute as of now, it
seems that it would cover volunteers rendering aid during a pandemic and
11 2
provide them with immunity from civil liability for injury or death.
3. Standards of Care
The primary cause of action brought by individuals who are harmed
during a pandemic will be for negligence. Whether or not they are
successful with a negligence claim will be depend on what the court
determines the standard of care during a pandemic to be. Some
healthcare professionals have tried to alter the normal medical standards
of care for public health emergencies because they know their
resources-and their services-will be overwhelmed and they will not be
113
able to perform as they normally would.
The Virginia Hospital and Healthcare Association put together a
working group to address altered standards of care in Virginia.11 4 The
legal standard of care requires that a practitioner "use the degree of skill
and diligence in the care and treatment of his patient that a reasonably

110. VA. CODE ANN. § 31.2-48.016 (2009).
111. Id. § 44-146.23(F).
112. See id.
113. See generally Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, Altered Standards of Care in Mass
Casualty Events: Bioterrorism and Other Public Health Emergencies, http://www.ahrq.gov/
research/altstand/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
114. See STEVEN D. GRAVELY, ALTERED STANDARDS OF CARE: AN OVERVIEW 5, available at www.
vdh.state.va.us/EPR/pdf/Health and Medical Subpanel.pdf.
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prudent doctor in the same field of practice or specialty in this State
would have used under the circumstance of this case."115 According to
this definition, during a pandemic, a court would take into consideration
the circumstances under which the treatment was given, including the
scarcity of resources.11 6
Virginia should adopt clear guidelines for
distribution of scarce resources during an emergency so that healthcare
providers may be sure that they will be deemed to have followed the
standard of care if they adhere to those guidelines. 1
C. Allocation of Scarce Resources
Resources will be quickly expended in the event of a public health
emergency in which a large percentage of the population is infected. It
is important to remember that resources are not just things, like hospital
beds and medication, but also people.
1. Things: Distribution of Vaccines and Antivirals
When allocating scarce resources, liability is only a minor concern for
healthcare providers compared to the ethical considerations of using
resources to save some lives while letting others die. During a pandemic,
"healthcare providers will be in the conspicuous and unfortunate
position of turning away many deathly ill people."118
Virginia has a stockpile of about one million courses of antiviral
medication for influenza,11 9 but Virginia also has a population of almost
eight million.1 20 Even if Virginia decides to use its entire stockpile
during a pandemic, seven million people will not receive the medication.
When people find out they will not be able to obtain the antiviral, there
is a potential for civil unrest, delaying response efforts even further.
For this reason,
[I]t is imperative that we begin drafting and publically
justifying our selection criteria now, well before a
pandemic is upon us. The stakes are so high, and the

115. Id. at6.
116. Id. at7.
117. See id. at 10.
118. Meir Katz, Bioterrorism and Public Law: The Ethics of Scarce Medical Resource Allocation in
Mass Casualty Situations,21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHmCS 795, 795-96 (2008).
119. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
120. U.S. Census Bureau, State and City Quick Facts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/51000.
html (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
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issue so volatile, that the public must come to understand
and accept, if only somewhat passively, the rationale for

distribution well before an epidemic strikes that will
121
inevitably stir up chaos in its wake.
The Center for Disease Control ("CDC") recognizes that pandemic
influenza is inherently different than normal seasonal flu vaccine
allocation, in which the criteria for providing vaccines is based on who is
at the highest risk for death.122 During a pandemic, the CDC suggests
that the criteria should be based on "preserving the functioning of
society" and that "[t]hose individuals who are essential to the provision
of health care, public safety and the functioning of key aspects of
society should receive priority in the distribution of vaccine, antivirals
'123
and other scarce resources.
Virginia, of course, does not have to accept this guidance when
developing its own allocation plan. The U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services has actually created a priority list in its Pandemic
Influenza Plan which includes the population to be vaccinated or given
antivirals and the rationale for putting them in certain tiers.1 24 For
example, the top tier includes vaccine and antiviral manufacturers and
healthcare workers who are in direct patient contact.1 25 The rationale
for putting vaccine and antiviral manufacturers in the top tier is "to
assure maximum production of vaccine and antiviral drugs."
The
rationale for putting healthcare workers who are in direct patient
contact in the top tier rests on the premise that "healthcare workers are
required for quality medical care" and "there is little surge capacity
'1 26
among healthcare sector personnel to meet increased demand.
Whatever course Virginia takes, it is essential that the justifications
for prioritization are legally sound and that the process for distribution is
fair. The CDC noted that there needs to be "consistency in applying

121. John D. Arras, Rationing Vaccine During an Avian Influenza Pandemic: Why it Won't Be Easy,
78 YALE J. BIOLOGY& MED. 283, 284 (2005).
122. ETHICS SUBCOMM. OF THE ADVISORY COMM. TO THE DIR., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, ETHICAL GUIDELINES IN PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 2-3 (Feb. 15, 2007), available at http://

www.cdc.gov/od/science/phethics/panFluEthicGuidelines.pdf [hereinafter ETHICAL GUIDELINES].
123. Id. at 3.
124. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN: APPENDIX D:
NVAC/ACIP RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRIORITIZATION OF PANDEMIC INFLUENZA VACCINE AND NVAC
RECOMMENDATIONS ON PANDEMIC ANTIVIRAL DRUG USE (Nov. 2005), available at http://www.hhs.
gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/AppD.pdf.
125. Id. at D-13.
126. Id.
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standards across people and time. ' 127 If Virginia does not distribute
vaccines and antivirals based on a fair classification of individuals or
128
groups, it opens itself up to claims of equal protection violations.
2. People: Compelling Healthcare Professionals to Work
Vaccines and antivirals are not the only resources that will be scarce
during a pan flu epidemic; convincing healthcare providers to work while
their families are sick and there is a high risk of infection will not be
easy. The American Medical Association "declared that 'individual
physicians have an obligation to provide urgent medical care during
disasters' and expressly stated that '[t]his ethical obligation holds even
in the face of greater than usual risks to their own safety, health or
life."'' 129 Yet other experts have stated, "physicians should not be
expected to place themselves at greater risk than the benefit they can
provide. 1 30 It is unknown what the response of healthcare providers
will be in the event of a 1918-scale pan flu epidemic. On one hand,
during the HIV crisis in the 1980s, some physicians refused to treat
patients who had the virus. 1 31

On the other hand, most physicians

132
continued to work during the SARS epidemic.

Some states require healthcare providers to work after a declaration of
a public health emergency.1 33 While Virginia has no such statute, the
Commonwealth does have one provision that directs officers and
personnel to cooperate with the Governor or the Virginia Department
of Emergency Management in any requests for "services, equipment,
supplies and facilities."1 34 This language is much softer than the South
Carolina statute and will not compel individuals, even those employed by
a state agency, to work during a declared emergency.
Whether
healthcare professionals work will likely be left to their individual
judgment, which will be heavily influenced by their ability to obtain
vaccines and antivirals and immunity from civil liability. This is an

127. ETHICAL GUIDELINES, supranote 122, at 5.
128. See generally Katz, supranote 118, at 805-06.
129. Carl H. Coleman, Beyond the Call of Duty: Compelling Health Care Professionalsto Work during
an Influenza Pandemic 94 IOWA L. REV. 1, 12 (2008) (quoting Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs,
Am. Med. Ass'n, Code of Medical Ethics: Current Opinions with Annotations § 9.067 (2008)).
130. Karine Morin et al., Physician Obligation in Disaster Preparedness and Response, 15
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 417, 420 (2006).
131. Coleman, supra note 129, at 11.
132. Id. at 13-14.
133. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-4-570 (2002).
134. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.24 (2009).
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example of how preparedness for the allocation of scarce resources
directly relates to other aspects of pandemic planning.
V. CONCLUSION

Planning for pandemic influenza presents special challenges. It is not
a typical emergency type situation, like a hurricane or even a terrorist
attack, where the emergency is centrally located in one area of the
country. Pan flu has the potential to reach every community in the
United States and spread throughout the world. Resources will be scarce,
and healthcare professionals will not be able to rely on normal standards
of operation. Pan flu requires early and extensive planning, and that
planning must include the legal community. Each issue that will come
up during a pandemic affects the others, and a firm legal basis for the
plans the government does adopt is essential to efficient response.
To answer the question presented in the title, "Is Virginia Ready?," is
impossible. We will not know if we are ready until a pandemic has come
and gone. Virginia has a strong start for pandemic planning, though
there are still some areas that need to be clarified. 13 5 While the Code of
Virginia may be clear as to some issues like quarantine and isolation,
decision-makers need to make sure the law is properly translated into
the plans and that those plans are properly understood by those who will
be in charge of responding to pan flu. The creation of laws and
procedures is only one step; the best response will be characterized by
open communication between all levels of government, responders, and
citizens as well as comprehensive planning, which must be anchored by a
foundation of legal preparedness.

135. See supraPart IV.A..

